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1 In many ways, the figure of Wilfrid Sellars personifies the second half of XXth century
American philosophy. He lied at the crossroad of three powerful traditions: German
rationalistic  phenomenology,  as  Marvin  Farber’s  scholar;  logical  empiricism,  as  a
philosopher grown up in the golden age of neo-positivism; and classical pragmatism, as
an intellectual deeply inspired by the need of keeping a synoptic vision and finding
practical and behavioral solutions for conceptual oppositions. In his last book, Wilfrid
Sellars  and  the  Foundations  of  Normativity,  Peter  Olen  makes  these  philosophical
backgrounds emerge, together with a strong professional and intellectual link to the
prominent minds of  his  time,  throughout the formal  and rigorous style  of  Sellars’s
works, lighting up the changes in his main philosophical concerns and in the solutions
he gave them.
2 The book is divided into two parts. The first one offers, in Olen’s words, “a historical
account  of  Sellars’s  early  thought  that  both  situates  his  attempt  to  formalize
pragmatics among his peers and historically grounds his conception of language and
linguistic rules as it  developed from his earliest,  under-analyzed publications to his
most cited works in the 1950s and 1960s” (p. 2); the second one is a precious appendix
of  unpublished manuscripts  and epistolary  concerning the development of  Sellars’s
philosophy described in the first part. But the book ends up in being more than a work
of philosophical historiography correcting the widespread ahistorical interpretation of
Sellars;  it  is  a  historical  reconstruction  aimed  to  clarify  and  possibly  solve  some
Peter Olen, Wilfrid Sellars and the Foundations of Normativity
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, X-1 | 2018
1
philosophical  problems  arisen  from  misunderstandings  between  Sellars  and  his
interpreters, and even between Sellars and other important philosophers as Carnap,
Feigl  and  C.I. Lewis.  Since  The  Pittsburgh  School,  in  its  position  between  neo-
pragmatism  and  neo-analytical  philosophy,  has  become  more  and  more  influential
through the years, such a clarification on his founder’s thought is much more than a
philological work. 
3 The central topic of the book seems to be Sellars’s shift from a formalist to a world-
directed conception of philosophy, its backgrounds and its reasons. Olen’s point of view
is  that  the needs contained in Sellars’s  first  formalism – preserving the distinction
between philosophy and the empirical  sciences,  and at  the same time preserving a
quasi-scientific method for philosophy itself  – found an answer in his later psycho-
sociological reconstruction of meaning, but this did not happen as part of a precise
philosophical strategy. The reasons behind Sellars’s first peculiar mix of rationalism
and  logical  empiricism  are  essentially  historical,  depending  on  the  unsatisfactory
coherentist  interpretation  that  had  been  given  of  Carnap’s  pure  semantics  at  the
University of Iowa. Sellars thought that pure pragmatics would have been a proper
answer to such coherentism, but his refusal in giving his pragmatics a link to the real
world (and not only to the logically possible ones)  made impossible finding a clear
formulation  of  the  oxymoronic  “pure  pragmatics.”  Only  when  he  started  reading
Carnap correctly he significantly changed his own philosophical aims, which in the end
were satisfied by a new formulation of the “solutions” he gave to his earlier concerns
and made  the  final  picture  of  his  philosophy as  apparently  fully  original  and self-
developed.
4 However, as the title of the book suggests, Olen’s real point was to focus on the concept
of normativity as the key to understanding how different paths in Sellars’s philosophy
have converged in a coherent conception. In his early formalism, Sellars shared the
positivistic vision that admitted substantially two kinds of rules for language: logical
ones,  which  make  language understandable,  and  conformation  ones,  with  Sellars’s
insistence in claiming, for the latter, something like an a priori deduction (in order to
avoid both scientism and anti-naturalistic psychologism). The deep point of agreement
with the positivists was Sellars’s conviction that there is something as an “empirical
meaningfulness”  that  makes  us  capable  to  distinguish between understandable  and
senseless  sentences.  The  passage  to  his  later  philosophy  is  clearly  marked  by  the
dissolution of this notion by two paramount considerations: first, the admittance that
empirical  meaningfulness  and conformation rely  on the criteria  of  a  community of
speakers;  second,  the  discover  that  modal  expressions  and  moral  commitment
introduce  in  our  language  numberless  sentences  which  are  not  reducible  to  an
extensional or descriptive language, and can be considered “empirical” only in a broad
sense.  At  the  end,  these  considerations  also  better  justify  Sellars’s  early  most
unmotivated assumption: the conviction that philosophy can and have to maintain an
explanatory role in the age of sciences, although being not in competition with them.
And how did this change in his meta-philosophy influence his original conception of
normativity?  Olen  wisely  reformulates  this  question  in  a  different  way:  “The  most
relevant question to ask, then, might not be ‘Does Sellars’s change in meta-philosophy
cause him to abandon his earlier philosophical positions?’, but ‘How does Sellars’ later
meta-philosophy change the justification (or lack thereof) for his first-order position?’”
(100).
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5 The author suggests that the answer should be sought by taking a look at the exchanges
between Carnap and Sellars himself. For Carnap and the early Sellars, formalism (and
pure pragmatics) is a part of the scientific method that investigates language. For the
later Sellars, instead, a non-factual characterization of language says something about
the nature of the language, i.e. about meaning. This bold connection between the formal
analysis and the concreteness of meaning is possible because of the broader conception
of  “empirical”  mentioned  above  and,  of  course,  because  of  Sellars’s  behavioristic
inclination, which allowed him to sing the praises of the S-R principle all together with
the arguments for the irreducibility of intentionality to descriptive language (in front
of his floored colleagues and friends). And, if we look at these three different points –
behavior,  intentional  language  and  formal  language  –  we  can  appreciate  how
normativity holds them together, since the latter is traditionally composed of formal
principles independent from empirical order and concerning behavior. Finally, and in a
perfectly coherent way, Olen makes two very different conceptions of language and
normativity emerge: the first one, typical of Carnap, which substantially denies that
normativity is sui generis and that there is continuity between the formal structure of
language  and  its  world-aboutness;  and  the  second  one,  which  is  more  or  less  the
opposite  and  focuses  on  the  hermeneutic  link  between  logical  generalizations  and
pragmatics.
6 Despite the fact that his reconstruction of Sellars’s thought makes the last one seem
precisely  an  attempt  to  mediate,  through  practical  arguments,  between  formal
requirements  of  meaning and its  dependency on the world,  Olen is  very careful  in
finding  Kantian  elements  or  even a  Kantian  project  behind  it.  Since  this  book  has
explicit  goals  of  historical  contextualization,  it  is  quite  clear  that  insisting  in
underlining the similarities between Sellars and a XVIIIth century’s philosopher would
look  like  an  odd  move.  But  the  idea  that  in  normative  language  we  can  find  the
connection between words and the world that we cannot find between conformation
rules and natural laws has much more of the Kantian primacy of practical philosophy
over theoretical  than we can ignore,  like also the division of philosophy from both
scientific laws and contingent facts and the search for non-arbitrary rules in formation
and transformation of sentences and connection of different meanings. 
7 All the point is, of course, the sense of that “non-arbitrary,” that could decide in which
direction Sellars’s Kantianism is oriented – if at all.  Both the possibilities chosen by
Sellars (in his formalist period, “non-arbitrary” in the sense of “logically independents
from the world,” later “non-arbitrary” as “constitutive of natural languages”) are open
to the same two-fold interpretation, which was magnificently expressed by Everett Hall
in a letter to Sellars himself in 1947:
If  one  gives  up  realism  in  favor  of  linguistic  formalism,  one  is  landed  not  in
Berkeleyan idealism but in absolute idealism. I think it also to be commended for
showing that the coherence theory is not only of truth, but also of verification, that
is its ‘coherence’ (in your terminology, ‘rules of conformation’) is neither logical
consistency  nor  a  merely  contingent  set  of  P-laws,  but  something  peculiar  in
between and, that its plausible outcome is not absolutism but relativism, that is,
both ‘true’ and ‘verified’ are relative to some “story.” (182)
8 Even when Sellars abandoned formalism, the idea that “both ‘true’ and ‘verified’ are
relative to some story” remained unmatched in its crucial position, in the form of the
dependence of conformation rules from psycho-sociological facts. As Hall pointed out,
with a bit of prophetic talent, such a dependence might mean two different things: if
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there is only one “story,” one is landed very near to a naturalized version of absolute
idealism; if there are many, one is landed in to the open relativism that Kant leaves
behind after his transcendental machinery is abandoned. And this choice was going to
be the central philosophical question for The Pittsburgh School, with – more or less –
John McDowell on one side and Robert Brandom on the other. McDowell, from Mind and
World, has found a way to keep together world-aboutness and coherence insisting in
saying that the world exercises conceptual force on a animals receptive to meaning; in
Hall’s words, “true” and “verified” are both relative to a story and to the world, since
the world somehow tells the same story to all rational beings. In doing this, McDowell is
giving complete development to the Hegelian aims in Sellars’s philosophy, maybe to
the detriment of his original insistence on the independence of the space of reason
from the space of nature, famously claimed in the sentence that knowledge is entirely
and  only  collocated  in  the  first  one.  This  development  is  subtly  ironical,  since
McDowell’s  professed quietism starts  just  after  he  has  reopened the  main door  for
metaphysics,  which  is  the  Parmenidean  identity  of  structure  between  thought  and
world. Brandom, on the other hand, interprets Sellars’s story-dependency of truth and
verification as an admittance that there is no semantic system that could incorporate
all the truth about everything, and that the best we can do in order to keep a synoptic
vision is (methodologically) trying to find connections between different stories, and
not (ontologically) trying to summarize them in a greater one. Brandom, of course,
insists  that  Kant  discovered,  and  Sellars  re-discovered,  that  factuality  relies  on
modality and activity on normativity, but is not interested at all in deducing from this
crucial point something about the essence of human beings or nature. In doing this – in
saying, following David Lewis, that what matters is knowing and not believing – he is
probably abandoning Sellars’s definition of philosophy as something that tries to find
the universal connection through all the things. 
9 This comparison between Sellars’s two most influential scholars has been necessary in
order  to  show  something  that  generally  comes  up  only  from  the  study  of  the
(untouched  by  Olen,  coherently  with  the  purposes  of  his  book)  consequences  of  a
system of  thought:  its  precious incoherence.  The two fundamental  aims in Sellars’s
philosophy seem to be, using a philosophia perennis language, an ambition to ordered
totality and a claim for freedom from monistic exigencies. It is very probable that they
are incompatible. In Olen’s more historically contextualized words “Sellars’s reliance
on  such  facts  [that  including  normativity  in  philosophy  of  language  would  imply
abandon formalism], though not exhausting his conception of normativity, is largely
responsible  for  the  tension  between  normative  and  naturalistic  commitments  in
Sellars’s philosophy” (3). Often, when Sellars found a sharp opposition like this one, he
tried to solve it accepting a weakened version of the first side and refusing the second,
but preserving something of its empirical aspect; he did so in the famous opposition
between the scientific and the manifest image of man, accepting the metaphysical aims
of the former and the empirical exigencies of the latter, and he did the same also about
that “tension” answering it with his peculiar nominalism. Since the ancient problem of
universals had three solutions (realism, conceptualism and nominalism), and Sellars
judged improbable the metaphysics of the first and even more suspicious the mentalist
ontology of  the second,  he was with no doubt a nominalist,  however his  own anti-
dichotomic way.
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10 The general idea is that, if a proper semantics has to get an explanatory role, it only
needs seeming to contain universals. These universals will be categories of behavior,
and  so  they  will  be  at  the  same  time  epistemological  tools  and  references  to  the
empirical world. As far as we can understand from Olen’s reconstruction, lastly, Sellars
ended up in giving the role of  the rationalistic exhaustiveness to the uniformity of
human behaviors, and the role of empirical contingency to the arbitrary constitution of
natural languages.
11 As it is well known, between their death and their becoming a classic all the important
philosophers live four or five decades of dereliction, when their works are at best only
quoted and their  original  purposes  deformed (often with an improvement,  without
doubt) by their scholars. Peter Olen’s Wilfrid Sellars and the Foundations of Normativity is,
together with other increasingly numerous studies,  a  crucial  step in order to bring
Sellars out from that state and make of him a true classic. We can also say that the goal
explicitly  pursued by the author has been successfully met:  the reader gets a  vivid
picture of  Sellars’s  philosophical  backgrounds,  continuities  –  somehow,  Olen’s
attention on individuating two phases of Sellars’s thought makes us better understand
the continuity between them – and discontinuities, following the natural development
of his thought without the teleologism that often afflicts systematic reconstructions.
Since the criterion of exposition is mostly chronological,  sometimes we have to put
different elements about the same topic together from distinct sections of the book in
order to find the theoretical connection. As a matter of fact, although the topics should
be  pure  pragmatics  and  normativity,  we  find  all  the  crucial  elements  of  Sellars’s
philosophy, as nominalism, epistemological behaviorism, and the interaction between
empirical sciences and philosophy. But, perhaps, such an irregularity is more capable
to give us the original proceeding of Sellars’s thought than any philological explanation
would have been. Lastly, the Appendix of unpublished texts and documents gives us a
rich and unusual view on the cultural environment where the last aims of traditional
pragmatism  and  neo-positivism  melted  into  the  analytic  philosophy,  making  us
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